机非混行驾驶行为博弈分析

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1002-0268.2014.12.019

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Abstract A utility function of driving behavior for non-motor and motor vehicles is built based on dynamic reduplicate game theory to study the decision-making behavior of a driver for non-motor and motor vehicles in a mixed-traffic environment. This utility is built according to a driver's personality that affects decision-making behavior, time refinement, and time difference to a conflict point between non-motor vehicles and motor vehicles in each period. Analyzing the utility function of driving behavior for non-motor and motor vehicles, shows that a Nash equilibrium exists in the game process, and the optimal decision-making for non-motor and motor vehicles in a dynamic game is obtained. The illustration shows that during decision-making (1) impulsive drivers choose the acceleration strategy; (2) mild drivers prefer the uniform or deceleration strategy; and (3) cautious drivers choose the deceleration strategy.

Key words： ITS mixed-traffic reduplicating game traffic conflict Nash equilibrium

Received: 20 October 2014

Fund:Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.51368046, No.71161005)

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	Articles by authors
	ZHANG Lin
	HUANG Xuan-wei
	WU Wei-ming

Cite this article:

ZHANG Lin,HUANG Xuan-wei,WU Wei-ming. Game Analysis of Driving Behavior in Mixed-Traffic[J]. Journal of Highway and Transportation Research and Development, 2015, 9(3): 85-93.

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http://manu27.magtech.com.cn/Jwk_gljtkj_en/EN/10.3969/j.issn.1002-0268.2014.12.019 OR http://manu27.magtech.com.cn/Jwk_gljtkj_en/EN/Y2015/V9/I3/85

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